Tag Archives: llm

Phil 6.19.2025

Back from the bike trip! Wenatchee to Boise – 930 miles, 45k feet of climbing. Started a bit out of shape but found some form. I’m a lot slower than when I did this in 2012!

Tasks

  • Laundry – done
  • Bills
  • Groceries – done
  • Cleaning – done
  • Lawn – done
  • Unpack – everything but the bike

Your Brain on ChatGPT: Accumulation of Cognitive Debt when Using an AI Assistant for Essay Writing Task

  • This study explores the neural and behavioral consequences of LLM-assisted essay writing. Participants were divided into three groups: LLM, Search Engine, and Brain-only (no tools). Each completed three sessions under the same condition. In a fourth session, LLM users were reassigned to Brain-only group (LLM-to-Brain), and Brain-only users were reassigned to LLM condition (Brain-to-LLM). A total of 54 participants took part in Sessions 1-3, with 18 completing session 4. We used electroencephalography (EEG) to assess cognitive load during essay writing, and analyzed essays using NLP, as well as scoring essays with the help from human teachers and an AI judge. Across groups, NERs, n-gram patterns, and topic ontology showed within-group homogeneity. EEG revealed significant differences in brain connectivity: Brain-only participants exhibited the strongest, most distributed networks; Search Engine users showed moderate engagement; and LLM users displayed the weakest connectivity. Cognitive activity scaled down in relation to external tool use. In session 4, LLM-to-Brain participants showed reduced alpha and beta connectivity, indicating under-engagement. Brain-to-LLM users exhibited higher memory recall and activation of occipito-parietal and prefrontal areas, similar to Search Engine users. Self-reported ownership of essays was the lowest in the LLM group and the highest in the Brain-only group. LLM users also struggled to accurately quote their own work. While LLMs offer immediate convenience, our findings highlight potential cognitive costs. Over four months, LLM users consistently underperformed at neural, linguistic, and behavioral levels. These results raise concerns about the long-term educational implications of LLM reliance and underscore the need for deeper inquiry into AI’s role in learning.

And some counterpoint: Does using ChatGPT change your brain activity? Study sparks debate

Phil 4.10.2025

Tasks

  • Groceries!

SBIRs

  • Need to ping T about expensis
  • 9:00 Standup
  • 1:00 RTAT

GPT Agents

  • A Survey of Social Cybersecurity: Techniques for Attack Detection, Evaluations, Challenges, and Future Prospects
    • In today’s digital era, the Internet, especially social media platforms, plays a significant role in shaping public opinions, attitudes, and beliefs. Unfortunately, the credibility of scientific information sources is often undermined by the spread of misinformation through various means, including technology-driven tools like bots, cyborgs, trolls, sock-puppets, and deep fakes. This manipulation of public discourse serves antagonistic business agendas and compromises civil society. In response to this challenge, a new scientific discipline has emerged: social cybersecurity.
  • Do Large Language Models Solve the Problems of Agent-Based Modeling? A Critical Review of Generative Social Simulations
    • Recent advancements in AI have reinvigorated Agent-Based Models (ABMs), as the integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) has led to the emergence of “generative ABMs” as a novel approach to simulating social systems. While ABMs offer means to bridge micro-level interactions with macro-level patterns, they have long faced criticisms from social scientists, pointing to e.g., lack of realism, computational complexity, and challenges of calibrating and validating against empirical data. This paper reviews the generative ABM literature to assess how this new approach adequately addresses these long-standing criticisms. Our findings show that studies show limited awareness of historical debates. Validation remains poorly addressed, with many studies relying solely on subjective assessments of model `believability’, and even the most rigorous validation failing to adequately evidence operational validity. We argue that there are reasons to believe that LLMs will exacerbate rather than resolve the long-standing challenges of ABMs. The black-box nature of LLMs moreover limit their usefulness for disentangling complex emergent causal mechanisms. While generative ABMs are still in a stage of early experimentation, these findings question of whether and how the field can transition to the type of rigorous modeling needed to contribute to social scientific theory.

Phil 3.17.2025

Pour one out – er, I mean in – for Saint Patrick

And I have said for a long time that we will know this administration by the way it treats the members of the Jan 6 committee, and Liz Cheney in particular:

I got cited! Feeds of Distrust: Investigating How AI-Powered News Chatbots Shape User Trust and Perceptions

  • The start of the 2020s ushered in a new era of Artificial Intelligence through the rise of Generative AI Large Language Models (LLMs) such as Chat-GPT. These AI chatbots offer a form of interactive agency by enabling users to ask questions and query for more information. However, prior research only considers if LLMs have a political bias or agenda, and not how a biased LLM can impact a user’s opinion and trust. Our study bridges this gap by investigating a scenario where users read online news articles and then engage with an interactive AI chatbot, where both the news and the AI are biased to hold a particular stance on a news topic. Interestingly, participants were far more likely to adopt the narrative of a biased chatbot over news articles with an opposing stance. Participants were also substantially more inclined to adopt the chatbot’s narrative if its stance aligned with the news—all compared to a control news-article only group. Our findings suggest that the very interactive agency offered by an AI chatbot significantly enhances its perceived trust and persuasive ability compared to the ‘static’ articles from established news outlets, raising concerns about the potential for AI-driven indoctrination. We outline the reasons behind this phenomenon and conclude with the implications of biased LLMs for HCI research, as well as the risks of Generative AI undermining democratic integrity through AI-driven Information Warfare.

Asymmetric power in the information age

  • The ubiquity of digital & social media has disrupted how democratic societies function. Journalists, politicians, and citizens often frame the problems of social media in the context of misinformation, about how lies spread faster than the truth, and how people seek information that comforts their beliefs. My personal interests were always more concerned about how the interactions of humans with algorithmic online systems at scale create emergent meta-phenomena.

Tasks

  • IGNITE slides
  • Return KP call
  • 3:00 Vision exam

Phil 2.12.2025

Snowed about 5-6 inches last night, so I need to dig out before the “wintry mix” hits around noon

Language Models Use Trigonometry to Do Addition

  • Mathematical reasoning is an increasingly important indicator of large language model (LLM) capabilities, yet we lack understanding of how LLMs process even simple mathematical tasks. To address this, we reverse engineer how three mid-sized LLMs compute addition. We first discover that numbers are represented in these LLMs as a generalized helix, which is strongly causally implicated for the tasks of addition and subtraction, and is also causally relevant for integer division, multiplication, and modular arithmetic. We then propose that LLMs compute addition by manipulating this generalized helix using the “Clock” algorithm: to solve a+b, the helices for a and b are manipulated to produce the a+b answer helix which is then read out to model logits. We model influential MLP outputs, attention head outputs, and even individual neuron preactivations with these helices and verify our understanding with causal interventions. By demonstrating that LLMs represent numbers on a helix and manipulate this helix to perform addition, we present the first representation-level explanation of an LLM’s mathematical capability.

GPT Agents

  • Slide deck – Add this: Done

NOTE: The USA dropped below the “democracy threshold” (+6) on the POLITY scale in 2020 and was considered an anocracy (+5) at the end of the year 2020; the USA score for 2021 returned to democracy (+8). Beginning on 1 July 2024, due to the US Supreme Court ruling granting the US Presidency broad, legal immunity, the USA is noted by the Polity Project as experiencing a regime transition through, at least, 20 January 2025. As of the latter date, the USA is coded EXREC=8, “Competitive Elections”; EXCONST=1 “Unlimited Executive Authority”; and POLCOMP=6 “Factional/Restricted Competition.” Polity scores: DEMOC=4; AUTOC=4; POLITY=0.

The USA is no longer considered a democracy and lies at the cusp of autocracy; it has experienced a Presidential Coup and an Adverse Regime Change event (8-point drop in its POLITY score).

  • Work more on conclusions? Yes!
  • TiiS? Nope

SBIRs

  • 9:00 IRAD Monthly – done
  • Actually got some good work on automating file generation using config files.

Phil 2.6.2025

From The Bulwark. Good example of creating a social reality and using it for an organizational lobotomy. Add to the book following Jan 6 section?

Full thread here

There is an interesting blog post (and thread) from Tim Kellogg that says this:

  • Context: When an LLM “thinks” at inference time, it puts it’s thoughts inside <think> and </think> XML tags. Once it gets past the end tag the model is taught to change voice into a confident and authoritative tone for the final answer.
  • In s1, when the LLM tries to stop thinking with “”, they force it to keep going by replacing it with “Wait”. It’ll then begin to second guess and double check it’s answer. They do this to trim or extend thinking time (trimming is just abruptly inserting “/think>”).

This is the paper: s1: Simple test-time scaling

  • Test-time scaling is a promising new approach to language modeling that uses extra test-time compute to improve performance. Recently, OpenAI’s o1 model showed this capability but did not publicly share its methodology, leading to many replication efforts. We seek the simplest approach to achieve test-time scaling and strong reasoning performance. First, we curate a small dataset s1K of 1,000 questions paired with reasoning traces relying on three criteria we validate through ablations: difficulty, diversity, and quality. Second, we develop budget forcing to control test-time compute by forcefully terminating the model’s thinking process or lengthening it by appending “Wait” multiple times to the model’s generation when it tries to end. This can lead the model to double-check its answer, often fixing incorrect reasoning steps. After supervised finetuning the Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct language model on s1K and equipping it with budget forcing, our model s1-32B exceeds o1-preview on competition math questions by up to 27% (MATH and AIME24). Further, scaling s1-32B with budget forcing allows extrapolating beyond its performance without test-time intervention: from 50% to 57% on AIME24. Our model, data, and code are open-source at this https URL

Tasks

SBIRs

  • 9:00 standup – done
  • 10:00 MLOPS whitepaper review
  • 12:50 USNA

Phil 9.30.2024

Larger and more instructable language models become less reliable

  • The prevailing methods to make large language models more powerful and amenable have been based on continuous scaling up (that is, increasing their size, data volume and computational resources1) and bespoke shaping up (including post-filtering2,3, fine tuning or use of human feedback4,5). However, larger and more instructable large language models may have become less reliable. By studying the relationship between difficulty concordance, task avoidance and prompting stability of several language model families, here we show that easy instances for human participants are also easy for the models, but scaled-up, shaped-up models do not secure areas of low difficulty in which either the model does not err or human supervision can spot the errors. We also find that early models often avoid user questions but scaled-up, shaped-up models tend to give an apparently sensible yet wrong answer much more often, including errors on difficult questions that human supervisors frequently overlook. Moreover, we observe that stability to different natural phrasings of the same question is improved by scaling-up and shaping-up interventions, but pockets of variability persist across difficulty levels. These findings highlight the need for a fundamental shift in the design and development of general-purpose artificial intelligence, particularly in high-stakes areas for which a predictable distribution of errors is paramount.

SBIRs

  • 10:30 LM followup. Moved the WP to LaTeX. Not sure about next steps
  • 2:30 MDA meeting

Grants

  • Finish proposal 10 – done! I think I’ll submit this one and see how it fits in the EasyChair format before doing the next one.

GPT Agents

  • Work on challenges section

9.26.2024

Really good example of potential sources of AI pollution as it applies to research. Vetting sources may become progressively harder as the AI is able to interpolate across more data. More detail is in the screenshot:

The alt text describes “Screenshot of a Bridgeman Images page, which shows what appears to be a 19th-century photograph of a man in a top hat, but which has appended metadata for a completely different work of art, namely, a late medieval manuscript, which features an image of the author Pierre Bersuire presenting his book to the King of France.

[2401.03315] Malla: Demystifying Real-world Large Language Model Integrated Malicious Services (arxiv.org)

  • The underground exploitation of large language models (LLMs) for malicious services (i.e., Malla) is witnessing an uptick, amplifying the cyber threat landscape and posing questions about the trustworthiness of LLM technologies. However, there has been little effort to understand this new cybercrime, in terms of its magnitude, impact, and techniques. In this paper, we conduct the first systematic study on 212 real-world Mallas, uncovering their proliferation in underground marketplaces and exposing their operational modalities. Our study discloses the Malla ecosystem, revealing its significant growth and impact on today’s public LLM services. Through examining 212 Mallas, we uncovered eight backend LLMs used by Mallas, along with 182 prompts that circumvent the protective measures of public LLM APIs. We further demystify the tactics employed by Mallas, including the abuse of uncensored LLMs and the exploitation of public LLM APIs through jailbreak prompts. Our findings enable a better understanding of the real-world exploitation of LLMs by cybercriminals, offering insights into strategies to counteract this cybercrime.
  • Citations: Lin: Malla: Demystifying Real-world Large Language… – Google Scholar

[2310.05595] Decoding the Threat Landscape : ChatGPT, FraudGPT, and WormGPT in Social Engineering Attacks (arxiv.org)

  • In the ever-evolving realm of cybersecurity, the rise of generative AI models like ChatGPT, FraudGPT, and WormGPT has introduced both innovative solutions and unprecedented challenges. This research delves into the multifaceted applications of generative AI in social engineering attacks, offering insights into the evolving threat landscape using the blog mining technique. Generative AI models have revolutionized the field of cyberattacks, empowering malicious actors to craft convincing and personalized phishing lures, manipulate public opinion through deepfakes, and exploit human cognitive biases. These models, ChatGPT, FraudGPT, and WormGPT, have augmented existing threats and ushered in new dimensions of risk. From phishing campaigns that mimic trusted organizations to deepfake technology impersonating authoritative figures, we explore how generative AI amplifies the arsenal of cybercriminals. Furthermore, we shed light on the vulnerabilities that AI-driven social engineering exploits, including psychological manipulation, targeted phishing, and the crisis of authenticity. To counter these threats, we outline a range of strategies, including traditional security measures, AI-powered security solutions, and collaborative approaches in cybersecurity. We emphasize the importance of staying vigilant, fostering awareness, and strengthening regulations in the battle against AI-enhanced social engineering attacks. In an environment characterized by the rapid evolution of AI models and a lack of training data, defending against generative AI threats requires constant adaptation and the collective efforts of individuals, organizations, and governments. This research seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the dynamic interplay between generative AI and social engineering attacks, equipping stakeholders with the knowledge to navigate this intricate cybersecurity landscape.
  • Citations: Falade: Decoding the threat landscape: Chatgpt, fraudgpt,… – Google Scholar

SBIRs

  • Meeting in NJ today, so mostly travel
  • Realized that I may be able to generate a lot of trajectories really quick by having a base trajectory and an appropriate envelope to contain whatever function (sin wave, random walk, etc) I want to overlay. Train that first, and then have a second model that uses the first to calculate the likely interception point. Kind of what like google does (did?) with predictive search modelling
  • Book club