- The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the “Poisoned Apple” effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator’s choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser’s welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator’s fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.
Why Musk is Culpable in Grok’s Undressing Disaster | TechPolicy.Press
- Grok’s functionality on X is not a black box, but the result of specific design decisions made by executives and engineers at xAI that shape its outputs. Because the platform provides both the generative tool and the means of publication, the company—which reports to Musk, its founder and CEO—is meaningfully responsible for the content it produces and publishes in response to a user prompt.
SBIRs
- 9:00 Standup – done
- Grinding progress on security – waiting on some questions
- Worked on the book a bit.
viztales 