7:00 – ASRC TL

• The Whole-Brain Child: Neuroscience Of The Developing Brain With Dr. Daniel Siegel
  • rigidity, integration, chaos = = stampede, flocking and nomad?
• Working on JASS paper
  • Based on the copyleaks comparison tool, here’s the overlap between the JASS and CHIPLAY papers:
• Working on AI paper
• Apache gateway server guide

7:00 – 5:30 ASRC TL

• Reading Army of None and realizing that incorporating AI is a stampede theory and diversity issue:
  • This makes Aegis less like a finished product with a few different modes and more like a customizable system that can be tailored for each mission. Galluch explained that the ship’s doctrine review board, consisting of the officers and senior enlisted personnel who work on Aegis, begin the process of writing doctrine months before deployment. They consider their anticipated missions, intelligence assessments, and information on the region for the upcoming deployment, then make recommendations on doctrine to the ship’s captain for approval. The result is a series of doctrine statements, individually and in packages, that the captain can activate as needed during deployment. (Page 164)
  • Doctrine statements are typically grouped into two general categories: non-saturation and saturation. Non-saturation doctrine is used when there is time to carefully evaluate each potential threat. Saturation doctrine is needed if the ship gets into a combat situation where the number of inbound threats could overwhelm the ability of operators to respond. “If World War III starts and people start throwing a lot of stuff at me,” Galluch said, “I will have grouped my doctrine together so that it’s a one-push button that activates all of them. And what we’ve done is we’ve tested and we’ve looked at how they overlap each other and what the effects are going to be and make sure that we’re getting the defense of the ship that we expect.” This is where something like Auto-Special comes into play, in a “kill or be killed” scenario, as Galluch described it. (Page 164)
  • Extensive testing goes into ensuring that it works properly. Once the ship arrives in theater, the first thing the crew does is test the weapons doctrine to see if there is anything in the environment that might cause it to fire in peacetime, which would not be good. This is done safely by enabling a hardware-level cutout called the Fire Inhibit Switch, or FIS. The FIS includes a key that must be inserted for any of the ship’s weapons to fire. When the FIS key is inserted, a red light comes on; when it is turned to the right, the light turns green, meaning the weapons are live and ready to fire. When the FIS is red—or removed entirely—the ship’s weapons are disabled at the hardware level. (Page 165)
  • But the differences run deeper than merely having more options. The whole philosophy of automation is different. With Aegis, the automation is used to capture the ship captain’s intent. In Patriot, the automation embodies the intent of the designers and testers. The actual operators of the system may not even fully understand the designers’ intent that went into crafting the rules. The automation in Patriot is largely intended to replace warfighters’ decision-making. In Aegis, the automation is used to capture warfighters’ decision-making. (Page 165)
  • Hawley argued that Army Patriot operators train in a “sham environment” that doesn’t accurately simulate the rigors of real-world combat. As a result, he said “the Army deceives itself about how good their people really are. . . . It would be easy to believe you’re good at this, but that’s only because you’ve been able to handle the relatively non-demanding scenarios that they throw at you.” Unfortunately, militaries might not realize their training is ineffective until a war occurs, at which point it may be too late. (Page 171)
  • Hawley explained that the Aegis community was partially protected from this problem because they use their system day in and day out on ships operating around the globe. Aegis operators get “consistent objective feedback from your environment on how well you’re doing,” preventing this kind of self-deception. The Army’s peacetime operating environment for the Patriot, on the other hand, is not as intense, Hawley said. “Even when the Army guys are deployed, I don’t think that the quality of their experience with the system is quite the same. They’re theoretically hot, but they’re really not doing much of anything, other than just monitoring their scopes.” Leadership is also a vital factor. “Navy brass in the Aegis community are absolutely paranoid” about another Vincennes incident, Hawley said. (Page 171)
• Working on JASS paper
• Working on AI paper
• Long chat with Eric H

7:00 – 4:00 ASRC TL

• • The mission of the Conference on Truth and Trust Online (TTO) is to bring together all parties working on automated approaches to augment manual efforts on improving the truthfulness and trustworthiness of online communications.
    • The inaugural Truth and Trust Online conference will be taking place on October 4th and 5th 2019 at BMA House in London.
    •  
      

      Key Dates

      • First call for papers: 2nd of April, 2019 *

      • Deadline for all submissions: 3rd of June, 2019
      • Notification of acceptance: Early July
      • Registration opens: End of June
      • Conference: 4th and 5th of October, 2019, BMA House, London, UK
  • From On Being with Pádraig Ó Tuama, about belonging gone bad and the scale of sectarianism:
  • Fooling automated surveillance cameras: adversarial patches to attack person detection
    • Adversarial attacks on machine learning models have seen increasing interest in the past years. By making only subtle changes to the input of a convolutional neural network, the output of the network can be swayed to output a completely different result. The first attacks did this by changing pixel values of an input image slightly to fool a classifier to output the wrong class. Other approaches have tried to learn “patches” that can be applied to an object to fool detectors and classifiers. Some of these approaches have also shown that these attacks are feasible in the real-world, i.e. by modifying an object and filming it with a video camera. However, all of these approaches target classes that contain almost no intra-class variety (e.g. stop signs). The known structure of the object is then used to generate an adversarial patch on top of it. 
    • In this paper, we present an approach to generate adversarial patches to targets with lots of intra-class variety, namely persons. The goal is to generate a patch that is able successfully hide a person from a person detector. An attack that could for instance be used maliciously to circumvent surveillance systems, intruders can sneak around undetected by holding a small cardboard plate in front of their body aimed towards the surveillance camera. From our results we can see that our system is able significantly lower the accuracy of a person detector. Our approach also functions well in real-life scenarios where the patch is filmed by a camera. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to attempt this kind of attack on targets with a high level of intra-class variety like persons.
  • More adding Wayne’s notes into JASS paper. Figured out how to make something that looks like blockquotes without screwing up the JASS formatting:

    \hspace{1cm}\begin{minipage}{\dimexpr\textwidth-2cm}
    	\textit{"Get him home.  And deliver my cut of earnings to the people of Phandalin near Neverwinter, my home". With this, before anyone can stop him, Edmund turns to the dragon. "I make a counter offer.  In exchange for them motions to the two caged people. I offer myself to take their place.  I will remain.  I will starve.  You will lose two peasants, and in return you will gain all that I have to offer.  Edmund of house DeVir of Neverwinter.  The last of a noble bloodline of the ruling class."} - Edmond: Group 2
    \end{minipage}

  • More Machine Teaching paper